Like everywhere else in the world, opposition in Iran is divided into systemic and anti-systemic. There are those who feel the Islamic Republic provides a level of popular participation that allows for the evolution of policy in one direction or another, always in line with the principles of the Islamic Republic. They are reformists. There are those who feel they have nothing to gain by validating the political process with their engagement, staying at home, or seeking political participation by other means. They are anti-systemic. The balance between systemic and anti-systemic opposition is crucial to any regime, including the Islamic Republic. A government that views all opposition as “anti-systemic” is forced to use violence to the point that its resources are exhausted. An opposition that, if forced to operate in the shadows is also exhausted. In this political marathon, the question is ‘who tires first,’ or ‘who has the clock and who has the time.
Who has the time?
The dominant political mechanism in Iran gravitates around the Supreme Leader, a caste of clerics with judicial and often executive authority in Qom and Mashhad, and the Revolutionary Guards power conglomerate, which wields executive, military, and economic power. Following the withdrawal of the West from the JCPOA multilateral deal, reduced the scope for opposition. For the last five years, the IRGC has been expanding its mandate to tighten its grip over the government, the economy, and the security apparatus. This has come at the expense of the space available for systemic opposition. The demise of President Raisi in a helicopter crash brings to the fore a political contest that is less about policy and more about personal power.
Figures that articulate socioeconomic opposition have been widely marginalised. Political activists such as Mostafa Tajzadeh, Mir Hossein Mousavi, and Zahra Rahnavard cannot contest elections. The same applies to human rights and feminist activists such as Narges Mohammadi, Nasrin Sotoudeh, Saeid Madani and others. Significantly, these activists do not operate within a political party with a cohesive governance programme for Iran. They focus on specific issues, which are thought to test the resilience of the Islamic Republic as a regime. The cumulative effect of these “single issue” movements could turn into a formidable systemic risk if they become a generational or intellectual divide that cannot be articulated within the system. These movements have indeed proliferated among Iranians over 30 years old. Middle-aged women, intellectuals, and ethnic groups of this demographic are no longer assumed to be loyal to the Islamic Republic. Nonetheless, some convinced reformists still believe in the possibility of a more tolerant and inclusive Republic. For instance, the leader of the Green Movement and former prime minister, Hossein Mousavi, calls for a referendum to pave the way to constitutional change, with the ultimate objective of “saving Iran.”
The opposition’s younger generation (15-24 years) is more radical and seeks regime change. They view any attempt to manage political change through institutional challenge as futile. Surging inflation, unemployment, corruption, and continued sanctions create a sense of urgency as youth dismiss reformist aspirations as a waste of time. Demands for gender equality, economic opportunity, freedom of expression, and national minority rights are often articulated in uncompromising terms, calling for “here-and-now” regime change. Frequently but not always, these demands are framed as calls for a secular regime or a Western-style democracy with little or no appetite for a political or juridical role for the clergy. The memory of the Shah regime is becoming less relevant. While in the past, the “authenticity” of the Iranian theocracy was part of a modernist anti-imperialist narrative, Iran’s Generation Z no longer shares or respects this memory of liberation. Instead, youth is seeking a path towards global reintegration.
Running the clock
The time is pressing as youth does not engage in the process of social ascendance that usually provides a pathway to a more conservative outlook on politics. Legislative elections in March signalled the threat of mass abstention from the polls, as turnout was at a 45-year low. The Presidential election on June 28 is a time of reckoning. If there is small participation, the anti-systemic opposition will take this as a signal of systemic weakness. One of the decisive questions determining whether Iranians will go to the polls is ‘who is running.’ Institutionally, an eligible candidate is decided by the Guardian Council, a body controlled mainly by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, comprising factions of the Shiite clerical establishment and the powerful IRGC military-political conglomerate. The vetting of Presidential candidates naturally limits the range of political competition and the motivation of broader demographic strata to come out and vote.
In the present tense, Tehran limits the scope for reformist politics. For the second time since 2021, the Guardian Council suppressed the candidacy of former parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani. Candidates even mildly associated with the movement that wanted to engage with the West, such as Ishaq Jahangiri, have been disqualified. The 27-party coalition, referred to as “The Iran Reform Front,” adopted a language of nostalgic idealism from the early days of the revolution. However, no iconic reformists such as Mohammad Khatami are allowed to contest. There is only one candidacy reformists can coalesce around, namely the self-styled technocrat Masoud Pezeshkian. Pezeshkian is of Azerbaijani-Kurdish origin. He enjoys the support of the Secretary General of the Reform Group, Anzar Mansour, as well as that of the architect of JCPOA, the former foreign minister Javad Zarif. These political backers should allow Pezeshkian to rally enough participation in the elections, adding onto an element of minority ethno-national mobilisation.
The electoral process is unlikely to engage the vast majority of young Iranians. Iran’s Gen Z is pushed to the socioeconomic margins, fueling the growth of an anti-systemic fringe. As the campaign evolves, Pezeshkian is eager to appear as a mainstream conservative choice, underscoring his loyalty to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. This strategy reassures the security apparatus and IRGC, even as Pezeshkian makes clear that he would limit the scope of IRGC’s involvement in university education and the military. Crucially, Pezeshkian capitalises on the economic insecurity of the middle class, pointing towards high unemployment, inflation, and the deterioration of welfare services. In pursuing this strategy, he is diluting the conservative reformist support base, hoping to add to electoral mobilisation of minorities. He is not likely to achieve much more than creating a formidable opposition. However, more people will vote, which is a welcome prospect in Tehran. The question is whether Generation Z will go out to vote for an unpalatable compromise.
The credible contestants for Presidential power are, in fact, conservative factions, who can reliably get out the vote. The regime is limiting the space available to reformists by holding onto a media monopoly, imposing restrictions on the internet, and using scant resources to cement their power base. Dissolutionment with a system that feeds on its own insecurities to retain support ultimately bolsters anti-systemic political factions. The extreme right ‘Endurance Front’ looks set to prevail. This hardline faction emphasises religious purity and opposition to the West, which they view as a satanic adversary. They are doubling down on the theocratic underpinnings of the regime, even though their spiritual forefathers were not among the supporters of the 1979 revolution and its leader Ayatollah Khomeini.
Materially, this faction’s influence is bolstered by access to clientelist networks within government bureaucracy. In 2021, this faction coalesced around the candidacy of Ebrahim Raisi. Within its ranks, one can count figures such as the incumbent deputy minister of foreign affairs, Ali Bahgeri-Kani, the Minister of Roads and Urban Development, Mehrdad Bazrpash, and Vice President Amir Hossein Ghazizadeh. However, the forthcoming elections will not feature any “continuity candidate” from Raisi’s cabinet. That is because Raisi’s administration proved largely incompetent, allowing inflation to skyrocket, oil revenues to tank, and international isolation to accentuate. They are trying to portray these elections as a chance for “rejuvenation.”
Therefore, the Council confirmed the candidacy of the former Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and former nuclear negotiator (2007-2013), Saeed Jalili. Jalili is a hardliner who, as a negotiator, triggered six UN resolutions against Iran and invested in the Axis of Resistance and relations with Africa and Latin America. He leads the Endurance Front, and he is likely to eventually get the support of Alireza Zakani, the incumbent mayor of Tehran. Adversaries to this neo-conservative faction are the presumed centrists or “realists” who portray themselves as security strongmen rather than pious leaders. Most prominent among them is the Speaker of Parliament and former Mayor of Tehran, Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf. His main achievements were repeated and heavy-handed crackdowns against the anti-systemic opposition while he served as chief of the police.
Systemic versus Anti-Systemic
Iranian elections are engineered, not rigged. The choice of candidates limits the scope for political reformism, leaving an ever-enlarging space for anti-systemic political mobilisation. As decades pass, the ideals of the Islamic Revolution are less relevant to Generation Z. The reformist opposition may remain relevant in this forthcoming electoral encounter, coalescing behind Pezeshkian. If he fails to bring out the vote, “status quo” powers will likely prevail. Still, the credibility of the elections as a mechanism for power distribution will be more openly contested. The Islamic Republic sees in these elections “the clock” that gives the regime the time it needs to create the socioeconomic conditions required to regain the confidence of broader socioeconomic strata. It is a fight Tehran is fighting against itself, between factions that seek to “resuscitate” the revolution of 1979 and those who want a rupture with the past and far-reaching reforms.
Reformists prioritise change to re-engage Iranians, while conservative purists prioritise the rediscovery of Islamic values. There are two things to watch for in the forthcoming elections: how many stayed at home and who was elected. These two questions hold the key to who has the clock and the time. The impression now is that anti-systemic forces grow more robust with every electoral encounter. The government has the clock, but the opposition has the time.
Ehsan Dastgheib is a Middle East and North Africa analyst. He is a PhD candidate at the Autonomous University of Madrid.
Ehsan Dastgheib
Ehsan Dastgheib is a Middle Easy and North Africa analyst. He is a PhD candidate at the Autonomous University of Madrid.
