Euroscepticism, even Europhobia, were part of the political arsenal of several political parties in the EU. However, for the first time, two national governments – mainly the Polish and the Hungarian – question a considerable part of EU’s core values. The recent attacks of the Polish government against the independence of the Judiciary, media freedom, the issue regarding the properties of Jews which were seized by the communist government, the women’s and LGBT rights, and the increasing questioning of the EU values are damaging Poland’s international relations. Hungary under the Fidesz party had deployed a set of policies both on the domestic and on the international level marked by racism, xenophobia, nationalism and anti-European rhetoric. How did two countries that gave the first signs of opposition to the communist rule and the Soviet Union become the champions of the anti-EU and radical right rhetoric? How did the two parties, the PiS and Fidesz, succeed in seizing power and controlling it through authoritarian practices?
European Interest had the opportunity to interview Dr. James F. Downes on the rise, governing and expected future politics of the two government parties. James Downes is a Lecturer in Comparative Politics in the Department of Government and Public Administration at The Chinese University of Hong Kong and a Senior Fellow and Head of The Populism Research Unit at the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR). He explained how the two governments move towards the radical right and their “bras de fer” with the European Commission and the European Parliament. He also discussed the potential of an alliance between the two parties and governments.
“Based on current events within both the PiS and Fidesz Governments, that it is only likely to be a matter of time, before a potential PiS-Fidesz alliance is reached, either via a formal EU Parliament bloc (with other political parties such as The League in Italy) or via an informal domestic level pact/alliance between both Fidesz and PiS”, argues Dr. James F. Downes.
European Interest: During the Solidarity years, a considerable part of Polish society embraced the proposal of opening up to Europe and establishing a tolerant society. Twenty-five years later, the PiS party succeeded in introducing authoritarian politics and practices? What were the main drivers of this electoral success in 2015? What is the party’s electoral base today?
James F. Downes: The PiS Party’s (Law and Justice/ Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) electoral success in the 2015 Polish national parliamentary election can be attributed to two key factors. Firstly, unique electoral system factors came into play that directly benefited the PiS Party. The scholar Aleksandra Sojka has expertly demonstrated in a publication at LSE EUROPP how “PiS obtained an absolute majority of seats in the lower chamber of Poland’s parliament (the Sejm) while receiving only 37% of the popular vote.” This occurred largely due to unique peculiarities of the electoral system in Polish politics that hurt smaller parties on both the left and right of the political spectrum alike at the 2015 national parliamentary election.
Secondly, and most importantly, PiS’s electoral success in 2015 under leader Beata Szydło can be attributed to socio-economic factors, particularly with decades of an underperforming economy, alongside the wider negative impact of the 2008-13 EU economic crisis and the subsequent economic aftermath. Furthermore, regional inequalities in the rural and eastern parts of Poland have arguably not been corrected and these regions remained largely underdeveloped, economically speaking. The governing centre right party Civic Platform experienced widespread anti-incumbency effects (arguably in part due to the negative economic effects and the party lost 59 seats overall) with Polish voters voting against the party and deciding to go in a different direction, with the election of the increasingly right-wing PiS Party (gaining a staggering increase of 101 seats).
The PiS Party was able come to power in 2015 by offering importance social welfare protections for citizens in Poland alongside identity based politics on socio-cultural issues such as immigration, with the incumbent Civic Platform party severely lacking policies on economic redistribution measures for voters.
PiS’s voter base has begun to increasingly resemble those of populist radical right parties, particularly in Western Europe. In a recent article published at the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right, my co-author Horace Wong and I argue that the PiS Party has shifted (ideologically speaking) from being a fully-fledged mainstream centre right/Conservative party to having now become a populist radical right party. We also find a striking pattern about the ‘types’ of voters that now vote for the PiS Party. Drawing on the 2018 European Social Survey Database, our findings revealed that in addition to strong anti-immigrant attitudes, voters that hold higher levels of religiosity (Catholicism) alongside anti-LGBT attitudes are much more likely to vote for the PiS Party. These findings highlight the unique electoral profile of PiS’s voters in Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) alongside the increasingly authoritarian nature of the party.
The recent arrival of refugees and migrants into Poland through the Belarusian border offered an opportunity to the PiS to politically exploit the migration issue. However, does the Polish electorate maintain the same anti-migration sentiments as in 2015? According to recent polls, the PiS popularity is fading. Is there a real risk of electoral defeat in case of snap elections?
There are still signs that the PiS Party can exploit anti-immigration attitudes amongst Polish voters. Drawing on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey dataset on party positions (2014-2019), we also found that the PiS Party has increased its anti-immigration policy positions from 2014 to 2017, with a slight reduction in 2019. Therefore, on the issue of immigration, the PiS Party is ideologically speaking a fully-fledged populist radical right party.
Recent polling evidence from the Politico Poll of Polls demonstrates a recent increase/positive uptick for the PiS Party over the last two months (August-September 2021) with the party polling at an average of 39% in the public opinion polls (as of 27th September, 2021). In contrast, the main opposition Civic Coalition Party is polling at 25% in the polls. Evidently, PiS is still far ahead in the polls and has significant political capital, in comparison to several opposition parties in Polish politics. Therefore, if a snap national parliamentary election was called right now, it looks likely that PiS would remain the dominant governing party in Poland.
The PiS Government’s increasingly hard-line stance on socio-cultural based issues is likely to play extremely well domestically amongst the core PiS voter base in Poland. However, if the PiS Party continues to play such a strategy in international politics, it risks further alienating itself from the EU, with the very real possibility of EU sanctions alongside worsening relating with countries such as the United States and Israel.
PiS politics with the proposed new media law, the judicial reform, the bill for the properties seized after World War Two, its authoritarian methods and ultra-conservative ideas on moral issues have isolated Poland on the international level. The EU, the US and now Israel are showing their unease. Is PiS aware of the damage being provoked? Is there a possibility of hardening its relations with the West and the EU?
This is likely to all be part of the grand strategy of the PiS Party in government. The PiS Government’s increasingly hard-line stance on socio-cultural based issues is likely to play extremely well domestically amongst the core PiS voter base in Poland. However, if the PiS Party continues to play such a strategy in international politics, it risks further alienating itself from the EU, with the very real possibility of EU sanctions (which could have damaging economic effects for Poland’s economy) alongside worsening relating with countries such as the United States and Israel. In the long-term, this is a dangerous game for the PiS Party to play, particularly in terms of international politics.
In 2019, PiS flirted with the Italian far-right League. However, the political alliance between the two parties and a consequent alignment of the Polish party with the European far-right didn’t occur. Were their different positions about Russia and its role in Europe the core reason? On the other hand, the fact that the party is leading the ECR Group in the European Parliament, a group consisting of far-right parties like the Brothers of Italy.
There are arguably two main explanations that can be put forward to explain the lack of alignment in 2019 between the PiS under its Chairman, Jarosław Kaczyński and the Italian populist radical right League Party, led by Matteo Salvini. The first concerns ideological differences/positions about the relationship with Russia. The second barrier in 2019 between both far-right parties was over differences surrounding the role of both parties and their status in the EU27. Interestingly, whilst both parties often adopt ‘hard’ Eurosceptic positions (i.e., seeking to leave the EU), both parties (in particular, the League under Salvini) have begun to diversify and change their rhetoric on the EU issue, with a more ‘soft’ Eurosceptic strategy (seeking to reform the EU from within amongst other populist radical right parties) beginning to emerge recently in EU politics. In short, PiS is without a doubt a fully-fledged populist radical right party family in 2021, with the party holding nativist, populist and authoritarian ideological positions.
Hungary has a long tradition in far-right and even Nazi and fascist politics dating back to the middle war period. Fidesz experienced a radical transformation from the liberal agenda of the 1990s to the xenophobic and authoritarian politics applied by its government. How would you explain this evolution?
This rightwards shift and evolution alongside democratic backsliding phenomenon of Fidesz is part of a more long-term pattern in Hungarian politics. I would explain this evolution from the perspective of Fidesz being an office-seeking party that has been in power for over a decade, since the 2010 Hungarian national parliamentary election. Fidesz under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is a pragmatic power-hungry party that has sought power at all costs.
I would argue that under Viktor Orbán’s leadership, that there has been a deliberate strategy towards the party becoming a full populist radical right party family, with Fidesz seeing the rightwards shift within the Hungarian political landscape and seizing the political opportunity to strengthen and consolidate their political power in government (via dismantling democratic institutions alongside checks and balances) with the Orbán lead government now serving a fourth consecutive term in government.
Hungarian politics has also witnessed incredibly high levels of volatility and political party fragmentation, with former extreme right-wing parties such as Jobbik (The Movement for a Better Hungary) now becoming more centre right/Conservative with their ideological rhetoric, alongside opposition radical right parties such as Mi Hazánk Mozgalom (Our Homeland Party) being formed out of a split from the formerly extreme right-wing party Jobbik. I explore the increasing right-wing volatile political landscape within Hungarian politics, with my CARR colleague Dr. Katherine Kondor, in a recent CARR Right Rising Podcast Episode.
In a recent co-authored article with Matthew Loveless and Andrew Lam in the Journal of Common Market Studies, we explored this ‘mainstreaming effect’ of right-wing discourse, particularly within the context of the 2015-18 EU Refugee crisis. More broadly, we observed how this phenomenon has important implications for the future of liberal democracy across Europe. In Hungary particularly, we argued how the formerly traditional centre-right conservative Fidesz has now become a fully-fledged far-right party, with tough anti-immigrant policies. Under Viktor Orbán, Hungary has experienced democratic backsliding and can now be regarded as a non-democratic country.
I would argue that the European People’s Party’s (EPP) decision to suspend Fidesz’s membership was not a surprise. It was more of a surprise how long the EPP took to suspend Fidesz’s membership of the EPP EU Parliamentary grouping, particularly considering the democratic backsliding patterns and violations to the Copenhagen Criteria … The overall decision therefore did not have a direct or indeed a substantial impact on Fidesz’s overall politics, as the signs have been there for some time now in EU politics that Fidesz under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is no longer a mainstream centre right/Conservative party, with Fidesz also now belonging to the populist radical right party family in Europe
EPP has suspended Fidesz’s membership. Did this decision (taken by the biggest political family in Europe) have a practical and substantial impact on its politics and identity?
In short, I would argue that the European People’s Party’s (EPP) decision to suspend Fidesz’s membership was not a surprise. It was more of a surprise how long the EPP took to suspend Fidesz’s membership of the EPP EU Parliamentary grouping, particularly considering the democratic backsliding patterns and violations to the Copenhagen Criteria (particularly to the rule of law and liberal democracy) that have been frequently witnessed in Hungary, over the past few years. A recent published study by the V-Dem Institute has also outlined how Hungary is now “the first non-democracy in the European Union.”
The overall decision therefore did not have a direct or indeed a substantial impact on Fidesz’s overall politics, as the signs have been there for some time now in EU politics that Fidesz under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is no longer a mainstream centre right/Conservative party, with Fidesz also now belonging to the populist radical right party family in Europe. Therefore, it made sense for the mainstream Conservative ideological leaning EPP to suspend Fidesz’s membership of the EPP party grouping inside the EU Parliament.
Euroscepticism, anti-immigration and Islamophobia (to mention some of the ideas of their ideological arsenal) are common views in both the governments of Poland and Hungary. However, PiS and Fidesz do not form a group in the European Parliament. What do you consider to be the main obstacles to such an alliance?
I would argue that based on current events within both the PiS and Fidesz Governments, that it is only likely to be a matter of time, before a potential PiS-Fidesz alliance is reached, either via a formal EU Parliament bloc (with other political parties such as The League in Italy) or via an informal domestic level pact/alliance between both Fidesz and PiS.
The main obstacles and barriers to a formal PiS-Fidesz alliance in the European Parliament is likely to be a structural and institutional one, as opposed to divisions over ideology. Currently, PiS sits within the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) Parliamentary grouping. The ECR has political clout and has 63/705 seats in the EU Parliament. Despite the Conservative ideological nature of this party grouping, this party grouping appears to sit well with PiS and its core leadership for the time being.
In contrast, Fidesz is without a party grouping and may consider joining either the (a) relatively newly formed (formed in 2019) Identity and Democracy grouping in the near future (71/705 seats) or Fidesz (b) may seek the creation of a new parliamentary grouping inside the EU Parliament. Thus, the most likely scenario on the horizon is that the PiS-Fidesz alliance would result in an informal pact between both right-wing lead governments, as opposed to a formal new EU Parliamentary grouping inside the EU Parliament.
Dr. James F. Downes is a Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in Comparative Politics, Head of Undergraduate Admissions, and a Programme Management Member of the MSSc in Public Policy Programme (MPUP) in the Department of Government and Public Administration at The Chinese University of Hong Kong. He is a Senior Fellow and Head of The Populism Research Unit at the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR), alongside a Research Fellow in the Global Europe Centre at the University of Kent/Brussels School of International Studies. He has also published in leading journals such as JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Electoral Studies and Columbia University Press/ibidem Press (Forthcoming).
